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Strategic ambiguity and leaders' responsibility beyond maximising profits
Abstract
Australia has the world‟s highest number of documented cases of mesothemilia, a lung cancer caused
by asbestos, and the building products manufacturer, James Hardie (Australia) has been accused for
causing over half of these cases (Hills, 2005). The Australian Securities and Investment Commission
(ASIC) sued several executives of James Hardie for misleading stakeholders on asbestos victim
compensation, and failing to act with care and diligence (ASIC, 2009). In a landmark decision in Australian
corporate governance, the New South Wales Supreme Court held in April 2009 that James Hardie‟s
chairwoman, nine directors and executives violated the law by approving and issuing misleading public
statements about the financial 2 adequacy of a foundation set up to compensate Hardie‟s asbestosis
victims (John, 2009). Other executives were also held liable for breaching their duty to act with care and
diligence. The ASIC chairman encouraged corporate boards to carefully consider the court‟s decision,
and “assess what improvements they can make to their decision making processes, the way they convey
decisions to the market and in the way they conduct investor briefings….” (ASIC, 2009).
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THE PURPOSE OF THE PAPER
Australia has the world‟s highest number of documented cases of mesothemilia, a lung cancer
caused by asbestos, and the building products manufacturer, James Hardie (Australia) has been
accused for causing over half of these cases (Hills, 2005). The Australian Securities and
Investment Commission (ASIC) sued several executives of James Hardie for misleading
stakeholders on asbestos victim compensation, and failing to act with care and diligence (ASIC,
2009). In a landmark decision in Australian corporate governance, the New South Wales
Supreme Court held in April 2009 that James Hardie‟s chairwoman, nine directors and executives
violated the law by approving and issuing misleading public statements about the financial
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adequacy of a foundation set up to compensate Hardie‟s asbestosis victims (John, 2009). Other
executives were also held liable for breaching their duty to act with care and diligence. The ASIC
chairman encouraged corporate boards to carefully consider the court‟s decision, and “assess
what improvements they can make to their decision making processes, the way they convey
decisions to the market and in the way they conduct investor briefings….” (ASIC, 2009).
The recent financial crisis and corporate scandals have further magnified the importance
of responsible leadership to build and sustain businesses serving multiple stakeholders (Maak,
2007; Maak and Pless, 2006). By analyzing the James Hardie asbestos compensation case in
Australia, we examine the role of strategic ambiguity (SA) on leaders‟ extended responsibility
beyond profit maximization. SA reflects the deliberate or intentional use of ambiguity or
vagueness in strategic processes. SA can be used by organizations to typically emphasize an
interpretation where the executive and organizational behavior is viewed more favorably (Ulmer
and Sellnow, 1997). The paper reveals how James Hardie leaders, against mounting community
and stakeholder pressure, took cover behind their purported primary obligation of maximizing
shareholder returns through a campaign that was strategically ambiguous. While Hardie leaders
engaged in minimum social responsibility standards, the use of strategic ambiguity appears to
have helped the company to avoid engaging in virtuous action extending beyond maximizing
profits.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Using Våland and Heide‟s (2005) regulators of organizational crisis, Ulmer and Sellnow‟s (1997,
2000) ethic of significant choice, and Bright, Cameron and Caza‟s (2006) organizational
virtuousness, we propose a Strategic Virtuousness Model as a framework for analyzing leader
and organizational responsibility in SA associated corporate action.
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Regulators of organizational crisis
The response to an organizational crisis can be determined by several factors. According to
Våland and Heide (2005), the response to a crisis passes through three “regulators”, which
influence the significance of the episode. We extend their model and present the Strategic
Virtuousness model as illustrated in Figure 1.
Drivers lead to increased emphasis on the crisis, increased awareness among stakeholders,
and public media interest. More integration/higher interdependencies between companies are
some examples (Våland and Heide, 2005). Internal Tools refer to the firm‟s own rules, processes
and structures that safeguard a “responsible” company. Measurements, auditing and reporting are
tools to strengthen internal efforts to comply with the company‟s policies and thereby build trust
with external stakeholders.

Figure 1: The Strategic Virtuousness Model
Leaders’
Responsibility

Regulators

Crisis

Internal
tools

Enablers

Strategic Ambiguity

Drivers

Evidence
Intent

Locus

Organizational
Responsibility
Human impact

Moral goodness

Unconditional
social benefits

The strength of the internal tools is also influenced by organizational consistency. Enablers are
generally designed to support, measure and assist in implementation, and enhance accountability
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for corporate performance. Våland and Heide (2005) point out that the effectiveness of the
enablers is also influenced by the level of consistency.
Thus the drivers, internal tools and enablers constitute regulators, which may reduce or
amplify the effects of the company‟s response to a crisis. In some situations, the impact of the
event may nearly diminish because public media show no interest in the episode or the company
has the necessary tools to defuse the situation. In other circumstances, the incident may cause a
significant uproar because it is illegal or in conflict with internal rules of conduct and ends up as
headline news (Våland and Heide, 2005). In these instances, SA is used by organizations to
manage stakeholder perceptions of organizational and leader responsibility.
The ethic of significant choice
In general, SA can be employed in four roles (Eisenberg, 2007; Eisenberg and Goodall, 1977).
First, the use of SA allows for diversity of views or interpretations, and promotes inclusiveness
and unity in its diversity. Second, SA can be used to preserve privileged positions by shielding
individuals from scrutiny or the revelation of sensitive or confidential details, while providing a
general overview or picture. Third, is its deniability. Vagueness in communication has the
potential and flexibility to develop future options by testing reactions to new ideas and
minimizing conflicts. Finally, SA facilitates organizational change by allowing interpretive room
for leaders to change behavior and course of action for the future.
By employing SA, leaders have opportunity to emphasize an interpretation where the
organization is viewed most favorably, and minimize the importance of ethics (Eisenberg and
Goodall, 1997). The deniability attribute of SA can be used by leaders to avoid blame and
responsibility or to preserve those who misuse their position and power. However, Paul and
Strbiak (1997) contend that “strategic ambiguity itself does not minimize the importance of
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ethics. Rather, intentional unethical use and the naivete of communicators serve to minimize the
ethical use of strategic ambiguity in organizations” (p.156). SA can be, therefore, utilized both in
an ethical or unethical manner. Its application depends on the ethical sensitivity of the individual
utilizing it.
Based on the framework offered by Ulmer and Sellnow (1997, 2000), at the individual
level, the ethicality of the leaders‟ use of SA can be determined according to three criteria. The
first criterion is the questions of evidence. The nature and complexity of any material evidence,
including their interpretations, often complicated by the use of rhetoric or metaphors, can be
examined for its reasonableness, bias and equity of impact on relevant stakeholders. The
questions of intent are often critical in determining whether any action is ethical or not. Applying
SA with an intent to misinterpret, mislead and deceive raises issues of social legitimacy (Seeger,
1986), honourable intention and truth. The final criterion is the questions of locus of
responsibility. Determining responsibility in a crisis for any organization can be ambiguous and
difficult. Taking advantage of this to shift the cause and blame to other parties or stakeholders
poses ethical issues. In this context, organizational virtuousness can be employed to determine
the consequences of organizational action in crisis situations.
Organizational virtuousness
Virtuousness is the “pursuit of the highest aspirations in the human condition. It is characterized
by human impact, moral goodness, and unconditional societal betterment” (Bright et al., 2006,
p.249). Human impact is the effect firm activities have on improving the living conditions, wellbeing and the resilience of beneficiaries. The moral goodness is based on the conception of
“character traits in people and organizations that are seen as desirable” (Bright, 2006, p.753). The
last attribute, unconditional societal benefit is the “intention to create goods of first intent and to
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prudently use goods of second intent to instrumentally bring benefit to society” (ibid).
Organizations demonstrating this attribute would initiate activities because it is the “right thing to
do”.
APPROACH
Using available secondary data on the James Hardie asbestos case in Australia, a single case
study was developed to examine the role of SA in CSR and leaders‟ ethical decision making. The
sources of data include media reports, James Hardie media releases and other publicly available
documents such as inquiry reports.
CASE APPLICATION AND MAIN FINDINGS
In 2001, James Hardie announced that it has been sued by 2,000 people injured or killed by its
asbestos products (James Hardie Industries Limited, 2001). The Medical Research and
Compensation Foundation (MRCF) with assets of $293 million was launched to settle all future
claims. In 2003, the company announced that the MRCF was underfunded (Hills, 2001; 2005). In
April 2009, an Australian court held that the board directors knowingly misled its stakeholders
when a media release said a new asbestos compensation trust was “fully funded” and “provided
certainty” for asbestos disease claimants (John, 2009). In addition, they were held liable for
breaching their duty to act with care and diligence.
Intense media scrutiny on James Hardie has been a major driver that has led to an
increased emphasis on the crisis and increased awareness among stakeholders (Figure 1). Due to
the action taken by Hardie victims, increased demands for transparency and growing expectations
on victim compensation has affected almost every sphere of activity of the company (Mahar,
2009). Growing public media interest reinforced stakeholder awareness. More integration and
higher interdependencies between these stakeholders, especially the State, Federal and corporate
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watch dogs such as ASIC have held Hardie accountable for the practices of their business
partners throughout the value chain.
Internal Tools refer to the firm‟s own rules, processes and structures that safeguard a
“responsible” company and its employees. Measurements, auditing and reporting are tools to
strengthen internal efforts to comply with the company‟s policies and thereby build trust with
external stakeholders. The strength of the internal tools is also influenced by organizational
consistency. Thus when Hardie employees handle, interpret and understand the victim
compensation saga very differently from other stakeholders such as the public and the Supreme
Court, organizational consistency is low. With low consistency, the significance and the
influencing power of internal tools are reduced.
Enablers are generally designed to support, measure, and assist in implementation and
enhance accountability for corporate performance. It can be argued that whilst knowing the
dangers of asbestos dust as far back as 1898, James Hardie continued to manufacture asbestos
products until 1986, showing little regard for safety standards and duty of care especially towards
employees and customers. Law, provisions and court decisions, entail rules against manipulation
of competition and laws with the aim of improving the ethicality of executive action. Hardie
continuing to manufacture asbestos until 1986 despite the first James Hardie death occurring in
1966 and its partner, CSR being forced to close down in 1966, shows a lack of duty of care.
In sum, the regulators consisting of the drivers, internal tools and enablers impacted
adversely on the executives‟ and company‟s response to the asbestos crisis. With intense media
coverage, the incident caused a significant uproar in Australia. In response, the company adopted
a strategically ambiguous campaign to paint a positive picture on the issue. For example, in 2001,
the Hardie CEO claimed that with starting assets of $293 million, the establishment of a fund to
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pay asbestos victims provides certainty for people with a legitimate claim against the company,
and that this establishment has effectively resolved Hardie‟s asbestos liability. However, only
after 2 years of making this claim, the $293 million allocation was proved to be grossly
inadequate. A 2004 estimate of the compensation liability was $2.24 billion.
Moving onto the ethic of significant choice, questions of evidence in the James Hardie
case are centered over the legal debates which occurred in the aftermath of the crisis. According
to Ulmer and Sellnow (1997), these altercations usually pit the organisation‟s team of experts
against those from legal or governmental agencies. For example, the legal debate that continued
with the James Hardie case on the companies‟ ability to hide behind the corporate veil (Merritt et
al, 2004).
Questions of intent emerge when the organization‟s social legitimacy is questioned. In
other words, if the organization cannot prove that it intended to produce reliable products and
services in a safe manner, it will likely lose whatever public support it once enjoyed. In the
Hardie case, the company lost the public confidence due to continuing to manufacture a harmful
product. With media reports and expert comments pouring out under headings such as “James
Hardie: No Soul to be Damned and No Body to Be Kicked” (Dunn, 2005) and “A Billion-dollar
Case of Poor Judgement” (Sexton, 2004), the Hardie executives continued with the usual rhetoric
of painting a positive image on the crisis, often, further damaging its social legitimacy. Merely
six months before the declaration of the compensation deal, Hardie was insisting it had no
intention to pay, that the directors‟ primary obligations to their shareholders to generate profits
prevented them from doing so, suggesting wilful disregard of public welfare by James Hardie.
Based on the application of Ulmer and Sellnow‟s (2000) ethic of significant choice
model, there is sufficient evidence, intent and locus to hold Hardie leaders responsible for the
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crisis. However, at the organizational level, the Jackson (Queen‟s Counsel) inquiry found that the
company had no legal obligation to pay compensation to its victims (Sexton, 2004). Despite these
inadequate outcomes on organizational responsibility as per Australian corporate law, ethically,
at an organizational level, organizational virtuousness can be used to assess the virtuousness in
the James Hardie case.
In a crisis such as of the asbestos victims of James Hardie, which resulted in loss of life
and livelihood and deterioration of wellbeing, the first attribute of organizational virtuousness,
the place of human impact is relatively easier to assess. With James Hardie chairwoman‟s own
admission and apology (The Age, 2004), there is little doubt that the asbestos operations of James
Hardie had a significant adverse impact on its victims. Considering the role of the second
attribute of organisational virtuousness, the moral goodness of James Hardie responses to the
crisis, the key question is whether the company did “the right thing”. Although no victim of
James Hardie has gone without compensation yet (Sexton, 2004), questions of evidence, intent
and locus show that the company was managed at the minimum level of corporate social
responsibility, meeting only its required legal obligations. At no time the company went beyond
its legal duty to engage in doing “the right thing” by the victims. One example is of the
misleading release of public information on the compensation funding. The Supreme Court found
that Hardie‟s chairwoman between 2004 and 2007 and nine directors and executives violated the
law by “approving and issuing misleading public statements about the financial adequacy of the
Foundation set up to compensate asbestosis victims” (John, 2009). The final attribute of
organisational virtuousness is unconditionality of social benefits, which according to Bright
(2006) is the “intention to create goods of first intent and to prudently use goods of second intent
to instrumentally bring benefit to society” (p.753). Several examples illustrate that Hardie leaders
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were not interested in goods of first intent (a virtuous pursuit), but attempted to protect goods of
second intent (company reputation) from any harm.
CONTRIBUTIONS
The recent financial crisis and other corporate scandals indicate that it takes responsible
leadership and responsible leaders to build and sustain a business that is beneficial to multiple
stakeholders (Maak, 2007, p. 329; Maak and Pless, 2006). On the contrary, in this exploratory
application of the strategic virtuousness framework to the James Hardie asbestos compensation
scandal, the findings suggest the leaders‟ irresponsible use of SA to typically emphasize a
favorable interpretation of the company‟s operations at the expense of asbestos victims. Evidence
show how, in the pursuit of maximizing profits, Hardie leaders ignored basic tenets of human
decency and caring towards its asbestos victims. However, this case can be identified as one of
the more extreme cases to examine the use of SA by business leaders. The application of the
proposed strategic virtuousness model in less-extreme cases could reveal interesting and subtle
tensions between variables such as questions of intent and moral goodness. Future researchers
could examine the application of the model on a larger sample of business leaders drawn from
several industry sectors and stakeholder perspectives.
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